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“WESTERN CIVILIZATION” AND THE ACCELERATION OF TIME. RICHARD LÖWENTHAL’S 
REFLECTIONS ON A CRISIS OF “THE WEST” IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE STUDENT REVOLT 
OF “1968”1 
By Riccardo Bavaj 
“The West” was in crisis – yet again. And Richard Löwenthal was deeply worried. The 
socio-political order of the Federal Republic had been challenged by the student revolt, 
and its impact was felt particularly strongly at the Free University Berlin where Löwen-
thal, born in 1908, had been professor of International Relations since the early 1960s. 
West Germany’s intellectual foundation had been attacked, and for someone like 
Löwenthal who had experienced the demise of Germany’s first experiment in liberal 
democracy, it seemed as though Weimar’s shadows were hanging over the Federal Re-
public deeper than ever before. The fateful tradition of German romanticism, “anti-
liberal and anti-Western” as he put it, appeared to have resurfaced once again. This 
time, however, it was not outright authoritarianism, but a leftist renaissance of romantic-
utopian thought that haunted the “second republic”.2  
Avowed advocate of what he saw as “Western values”, Löwenthal was amongst the 
most articulate exponents of “consensus liberalism”, which was, as Michael 
Hochgeschwender has argued, the “fundamental ideology of the West” from the 1940s 
to the late 1960s.3 For liberal scholars like Löwenthal, whose self-imposed mission was 
to anchor the Federal Republic firmly in the realm of what had come to be known as 
“Western democracies”, nothing less than the success of their chief political project was 
at stake in “1968”. It seemed as though West Germany’s stability had been seriously 
undermined, and its security jeopardized.  
—————— 
 
 This article is based on research conducted as a Feodor Lynen Research Fellow at Saint Louis Uni-
versity, Missouri, U.S.A. I am indebted to Dr. Mark E. Ruff for his support, and to the Alexander 
von Humboldt Foundation for the award of the fellowship. 
1  Essay on the source: Löwenthal, Richard: Gesellschaftswandel und Kulturkrise. Zukunftsprobleme 
der westlichen Demokratien (1979). 
2  Löwenthal, Richard, Vorwort, in: Löwenthal, Richard, Der romantische Rückfall. Wege und Irrwege 
einer rückwärts gewendeten Revolution, Stuttgart 1970, pp. 5-10, here p. 8. 
3  Hochgeschwender, Michael, Was ist der Westen? Zur Ideengeschichte eines politischen Konstrukts, 
in: Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen 11 (2004), pp. 1-30, here p. 27; see also Doering-Manteuffel, 
Anselm, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?, Göttingen 1999; Gassert, Philipp, Die Bundesrepublik, 
Europa und der Westen. Zur Verwestlichung, Demokratisierung und einigen komparatistischen De-
fiziten der zeithistorischen Forschung, in: Baberowski, Jörg et al, Geschichte ist immer Gegenwart. 
Vier Thesen zur Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart 2001, pp. 67-89; Nehring, Holger, “Westernization”. A 
New Paradigm for Interpreting West European History in a Cold War Context, in: Cold War History 
4 (2004), No. 2, pp. 175-191; for the term “consensus liberalism” see especially Hochgeschwender, 
Michael, Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen, Munich 
1998, pp. 68-86; Hodgson, Godfrey, America in Our Time. From World War II to Nixon, new ed. 
New York 2005 (first ed. 1976). 
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Liberal scholars in the Federal Republic typically perceived the revolt as yet another 
fatal deviation of German history from “the West”. This may seem astonishing given 
the transnational dimension of student protest in the mid- and late-1960s. Yet to make 
sense of this challenge, they fell back on the “special path” interpretation that had 
gained currency in the previous decade. They were determined to drag the Federal Re-
public away from the murky currents of Germany’s past by “Westernizing” its political 
culture, and found their goal torpedoed by radical students who had a rather ambiguous 
relationship to “the West”.4  
Löwenthal’s strategy of dealing with the student challenge, however, was more 
complex. He combined the thesis of Germany’s “special path” with the notion of a “cri-
sis of Western civilization”. He was the only liberal scholar in West Germany who pur-
sued that avenue. Well aware of the transnational nature of the student revolt, Löwen-
thal looked beyond the framework of the nation state. While the Federal Republic was 
surely the country he cared about most deeply, he was convinced that analyzing the cri-
sis would require looking at a bigger picture: in particular, at the United States, the sup-
posed apex of Western civilization where things did not seem to look very bright either. 
In fact, it was on a research trip to Stanford University during the academic year 
1968-69 that Löwenthal developed his argument of a “crisis of Western civilization”. 
To be sure, as early as 1965, during a one-year fellowship at Columbia University, 
Löwenthal had given a lecture on “totalitarianism and the future of civilization”, in 
which he discussed “symptoms of moral and cultural crisis” that “were now visible in 
the most advanced Western countries”.5 Yet he did not elaborate on this theme until 
1969 when he gave a lecture at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, entitled “un-
reason and revolution”6, apparently mocking the title of Marcuse’s Hegel book7. For 
almost the rest of his life, Löwenthal was preoccupied with Western civilization and the 
challenge of its preservation. He engaged with this issue most rigorously in a collection 
of essays entitled “Social Change and Cultural Crisis”, that first appeared in German in 
1979. A revised version was published in English five years later.8  
—————— 
 
4  See Bavaj, Riccardo, Das Trauma von “1968”. Liberale Hochschullehrer in Westdeutschland und 
Frankreich, in: Totalitarismus und Demokratie 6 (2009), No. 1, pp. 101-114; Bavaj, Riccardo, Deut-
scher Staat und westliche Demokratie. Karl Dietrich Bracher und Erwin K. Scheuch zur Zeit der 
Studentenrevolte von 1967/68, in: Geschichte im Westen 23 (2008), pp. 149-171; see also Gassert, 
Philipp, Gegen Ost und West. Antiamerikanismus in der Bundesrepublik, in: Junker, Detlef (ed.), 
Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945-1990. Ein Handbuch, Vol. 1, Stutt-
gart 2001, pp. 944-954, here pp. 953-954; Gassert, Philipp, Mit Amerika gegen Amerika. Antiameri-
kanismus in Westdeutschland, in: Junker (ed.), USA und Deutschland, Vol. 2, pp. 750-760. 
5  Löwenthal, Richard, The Totalitarian Revolutions of our Time. Manuscript written for the series 
“The 1965 Keynote Lectures” broadcast on Radio Free Europe in 1965, in: Löwenthal, Richard, 
Faschismus – Bolschewismus – Totalitarismus. Schriften zur Weltanschauungsdiktatur im 20. Jahr-
hundert, ed. by Mike Schmeitzner, Göttingen 2009, pp. 475-545, here p. 541. 
6  Löwenthal gave the lecture in February 1969. It was published several times in German and English: 
Löwenthal, Richard, Unvernunft und Revolution. Über die Loslösung der revolutionären Praxis von 
der marxistischen Theorie, in: Der Monat 21 (1969), No. 251, also in Löwenthal, Romantischer 
Rückfall, pp. 41-87; see also the interview with Löwenthal on the “worldwide revolt of the young” 
in Irving Howe’s journal Dissent, May-June 1969, pp. 214-224. 
7  Marcuse, Herbert, Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, London 1941 (re-
vised ed. New York 1954; 6th ed. Boston 1968). 
8  Löwenthal: Gesellschaftswandel und Kulturkrise; Löwenthal, Richard, Social Change and Cultural 
Crisis, New York 1984. 
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Before giving an outline of Löwenthal’s reflections, it is necessary to clarify what 
he meant by “Western values”. Rather conveniently, he drew up a five-point check list 
of what he thought were essential features of “Western civilization”. To mention the 
three most important ones: the belief in the autonomy of reason as the key for any un-
derstanding of the world; the belief in the uniqueness of the individual endowed with 
inalienable rights; and the conception of work, intellectual and physical, as a means of 
acquiring merit and giving meaning to life. Löwenthal maintained that this cluster of 
fundamental values was at the heart of the “unique dynamic” of “Western civilization”.9 
The crux of the matter was that a dynamic civilization like “the West” generated 
“moral, cultural and institutional problems” that endangered its very existence. The 
logical conclusion was that the institutions and the “norms of conduct” that had 
emerged from the cluster of “Western values” needed to be adjusted in order to cope 
with these problems. The crucial point Löwenthal was keen to get across was that these 
adjustments did not take place automatically. Rather, they were the result of “political, 
social, and often [...] religious struggles”. If people did not make the necessary adjust-
ments for a prolonged period of time, the “norms of conduct” would become inapplica-
ble, the institutions would lose their authority, and the framework of basic values, in-
creasingly perceived as sheer hypocrisy, would become defunct. It was a situation like 
this, in which essential adjustments had not been made, that Löwenthal called a “cul-
tural crisis” – a situation of collective anomie.10  
While Löwenthal realized, in the mid-1970s, that the “explosive and violent phase 
of the [youth] revolt” had passed, he warned that the underlying phenomenon of a “cul-
tural crisis” was far from over. For the disaffection of the “young Western intelligent-
sia” with pluralist democracy was merely an epiphenomenon of a “long-term cultural 
crisis” which prevailed despite the continued ability of the social and political system to 
function reasonably well. He was particularly worried about “West-wide phenomena” 
such as the decline of the work ethic and the dissolution of social cohesion, all of which 
pointed to severe problems in socialization and identity formation. Far more serious 
than the abstract sloganeering of a “Great Refusal” during the student revolt, these 
symptoms of social “decay” revealed a serious “cultural crisis” that undermined the 
authority of “Western” institutions.11 
In Löwenthal’s opinion, two developments were responsible for this crisis: First, the 
destruction of the belief in a meaningful course of history led to a “loss of world orien-
tation” (Weltbildverlust). The faith in a continual progress of rationality, which had 
supposedly replaced any transcendental belief system, had become discredited by a “se-
ries of historical shocks”. The experience of two world wars had seriously weakened the 
faith in a continuous progress of reason. And this faith was further challenged in the 
1960s and 1970s: above all by the Vietnam War, but also by a growing awareness of the 
ecological costs and natural limits of economic growth. Second, the rapid acceleration 
of social change had led to a “loss of ties” (Bindungsverlust). The gestation of a society 
—————— 
 
9  Löwenthal, Richard, Die Intellektuellen zwischen Gesellschaftswandel und Kulturkrise, based on a 
lecture given at the Salzburg Humanismusgespräch in September 1976, published in: Schatz, Oskar 
(ed.), Abschied von Utopia?, Graz 1977, and Baier, Horst (ed.), Freiheit und Sachzwang. Festschrift 
für Helmut Schelsky, Opladen 1977, also in: Löwenthal: Gesellschaftswandel und Kulturkrise, pp. 
21-36, here pp. 26-27. 
10  Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
11  Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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of mass consumption that transformed family structures and the role of leisure in every-
day life made the process of passing on “norms of conduct” from one generation to an-
other increasingly difficult. What Löwenthal found particularly worrying was the weak-
ening of ties to the historical community of the nation state, a phenomenon that for ob-
vious reasons was especially severe in the Federal Republic, but was also discernable in 
other “Western countries”:12 “We are living in an age of Western self-doubt”.13 
Löwenthal’s worries about “an important part of the young generation”, as he fre-
quently put it14, were exacerbated by the sociological diagnosis advanced by Daniel Bell 
that industrial societies were undergoing a far-reaching transition, namely the transfor-
mation from an industrial society to a “post-industrial” knowledge society. As early as 
1962, Bell had argued that a “post-industrial society” would give well-educated elites 
greater societal importance.15 Against this background, not just Löwenthal, but also Bell 
himself, from the late 1960s onward, worried about “crises of belief” and “societal in-
stability”.16 
In this essay, I would like to address two questions in particular: First, why did 
Löwenthal avail himself of the “Western crisis” paradigm when none of his West Ger-
man colleagues did (at least not that prominently)? Second, why did Löwenthal make 
use of it when he did? While it is certainly rather difficult to account fully for the ra-
tionale behind Löwenthal’s usage of the “Western crisis” paradigm, I would suggest the 
following hypotheses: First, Löwenthal had always thought globally. He tackled issues 
of International Relations that touched on a wide range of countries, including the So-
viet Union, China, Cuba, and of course Western Europe and the United States. While 
many of his colleagues were concerned with rather parochial issues, he had always been 
a transnational thinker. Second, Löwenthal acted globally. Only few of his colleagues 
could match the range of his transnational activities. He participated in the work of a 
dozen of institutions, amongst them the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the Salzburg 
Seminar in American Studies and the Trilateral Commission. All of them brought to-
gether experts and intellectuals from various parts of the world. 
Initially, of course, his transnational engagement was not something he embarked 
upon voluntarily. As a Jewish socialist, member of the Communist Party at first and 
then one of the leading figures of a left-socialist resistance group (Neues Beginnen), he 
emigrated to Prague in 1935 and to London four years later. He became a British citizen 
and worked as a news correspondent for Reuters and the Observer. To be sure, a life 
story like Löwenthal’s that cut across national borders time and again was not very un-
usual in the “age of ideologies”, to borrow a term coined by Löwenthal’s younger col-
—————— 
 
12  Ibid., pp. 30-34. 
13  Löwenthal, Richard, Von der Einzigartigkeit des Westens, in: Löwenthal: Gesellschaftswandel und 
Kulturkrise, pp. 9-20, here p. 15. 
14  See for instance Löwenthal, Richard, Bonn und Weimar. Zwei deutsche Demokratien, in: Winkler, 
Heinrich August (ed.), Politische Weichenstellungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945-1953, Göttin-
gen 1979, also in: Löwenthal: Gesellschaftswandel und Kulturkrise, pp. 257-277, here p. 275. 
15  Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting, special anni-
versary ed. with “The Axial Age of Technology Foreword”, New York 1999 (first ed. 1973). The 
book did not come out until 1973, but contained articles that had been published before. Bell first ar-
ticulated the idea of a “post-industrial society” in 1962.  
16  Bell, Daniel, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, 20th anniversary ed. with a new afterword, 
New York 1996 (first ed. 1976). The German title read: Die Zukunft der westlichen Welt, Frankfurt 
am Main 1976. 
Themenportal  Europäische  Geschichte  www.europa.clio-online.de 
  Seite: 5 von 8 
league Karl Dietrich Bracher.17 Emigration studies have been a vibrant field of research 
over the last twenty years and have provided us with numerous examples of the circui-
tous path that many scholars had to take as a result of Hitler’s dictatorship.  
Against this background, a further reason must be found to explain Löwenthal’s 
turn to the “Western crisis” paradigm. The main factor, I would argue, was Löwenthal’s 
intellectual socialization. After studying law and economics in Berlin, he immersed 
himself in the intellectual cosmos of the University of Heidelberg where he became 
acquainted with Alfred Weber’s cultural sociology and especially with the studies of 
Alfred’s late brother.18 Perhaps not surprisingly, it was indeed Max Weber, with his 
work on Occidental rationalization and the protestant ethic of capitalism, who strongly 
influenced Löwenthal’s view of “Western civilization”. While Löwenthal rarely refer-
enced his texts and did not really care about the minutiae of scholarly citation tech-
niques – in many ways, he kept his journalistic habit as an academic –, he sometimes 
explicitly referred to Max Weber as the main source for his theory of “Western civiliza-
tion”.  
Weber, however, was not the only source for what would become Löwenthal’s pre-
occupation with the “Western crisis” paradigm. Perhaps even more important was the 
impact of his political mentor Franz Borkenau. He first met the young historian in 1926 
when he became part of a communist student association (Kommunistische Studenten-
fraktion) led by Borkenau. Both of them became increasingly disenchanted with the 
communist creed, especially in view of the party doctrine of “Social Fascism”, the in-
famous “show trials” and the Hitler-Stalin-Pact.19  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Vienna-born historian developed a 
strong interest in the evolution of “Western civilization” which became the principal 
focus of his work. Typical of the discourse of “Western civilization” in general, Borke-
nau was not merely concerned with the beginnings of “the West”, but also with its (po-
tential) end. In 1947, he published an article in the British monthly Horizon which car-
ried the laconic, if telling title “After the Atom”. In it, he painted the dark scenario of 
the “real possibility” of an atomic war which would, even in the likely case of a West-
ern victory, lead to the collapse of Western civilization. The assumption that its Euro-
pean heartland was “already in a process of decline”, especially in light of Nazism’s 
inner-Western “revolt against the West”, strengthened his belief that Western civiliza-
tion, devastated by an atomic war, would enter an age of disintegration and “relapse into 
barbarism” in a manner similar to the demise of the West Roman Empire.20  
—————— 
 
17  Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Zeit der Ideologien. Eine Geschichte politischen Denkens im 20. Jahrhun-
derts, Stuttgart 1982. 
18  See Blomert, Reinhard, Intellektuelle im Aufbruch. Karl Mannheim, Alfred Weber, Norbert Elias 
und die Heidelberger Sozialwissenschaften der Zwischenkriegszeit, Munich 1999, pp. 239-240, 243-
244. 
19  For a first attempt to delineate Löwenthal’s transition from communism to “consensus liberalism” 
see Schmidt, Oliver, “Meine Heimat ist – die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung”. Biographische Studien 
zu Richard Löwenthal im Übergang vom Exil zur frühen Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt am Main 2007. 
20  Borkenau, Franz, After the Atom. Life out of Death or Life in Death? [1947], in: Borkenau, Franz, 
End and Beginning. On the Generations of Cultures and the Origins of the West, ed. by Richard 
Löwenthal, New York 1981, pp. 437-448, here pp. 439, 441, 444; for Borkenau’s views on Nazism 
see his account: The Totalitarian Enemy, London 1940. As Löwenthal’s “special path” version had 
it, Nazism’s inner-Western “revolt against the West” was a revolt that was rooted in Germany’s 
Faustian “in-between culture”, geographically situated in “the West”, but culturally only partly be-
longing to it, given the fateful legacy of German Lutheranism. This notion was informed by 
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The narrative pattern of ascendency and decline, so well displayed in Borkenau’s 
postwar writings, were certainly characteristic of the discourse on “Western civiliza-
tion” as a whole. In fact, Borkenau’s reflections were not only redolent of Oswald 
Spengler’s decline narrative; they also bore the traces of another major exponent of the 
“Western civ.” paradigm: the British historian Arnold Toynbee whose gargantuan, 
multi-volume study of world civilizations has remained unmatched, though certainly not 
unchallenged. It was Toynbee who most prominently elaborated the view that “Western 
civilization”, alongside twenty other civilizations in world history, would be an “intelli-
gible unit of study”, a statement that was repeatedly quoted by Borkenau – as well as by 
Löwenthal. Toynbee reached the height of his fame in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the very moment Borkenau set out to explore the origins of “the West”. It 
comes as no surprise that his texts were shot through with Toynbeean notions of 
“rhythms”, “crises”, and “breakdowns” of civilizations.21  
A comprehensive comparison between Löwenthal and Borkenau would certainly 
transcend the scope of this essay. It is safe to say, however, that Löwenthal’s views on 
“Western civilization” owed a great deal to the thoughts of his political and intellectual 
mentor. The stark dichotomy between a dynamic, creative Western and a static, “inver-
tebrate” Eastern civilization is but one example of a large repertoire of rhetorical com-
monplaces that recurred in the writings of the two renegades. Indeed, it is the mental 
mapping of Russia, the creation of a timeless, fast-frozen image of barbaric Russian 
authoritarianism that is particularly striking. In the article “After the Atom”, for exam-
ple, Borkenau constructed a spatial, value-laden continuity between “West” and “East” 
that reached back to the times of Ancient Greece.22 Löwenthal, after discarding his ini-
tial preference for building a socialist Europe as a “third force” independent of East and 
West23, bought into Borkenau’s spatio-political constructions, though for the time being 
he did not share the pessimistic prospect Borkenau held out for “the West”. Until the 
late 1960s, Löwenthal’s view of the state of “Western civilization” was much more 
cheerful. 
This, of course, raises the question why he began to make use of the “Western cri-
sis” paradigm when he did. I would argue that the student revolt, which he perceived as 
an attack against “Western values”, transformed his initial worries about the inner sta-
bility of “the West” (as articulated in his lecture from 196524) into a deep concern about 
“Western civilization” and a constant preoccupation with its condition of crisis. The 
student unrest strengthened his view that a rapid “acceleration of time”25, ultimately 
caused by the “unique dynamic” of Western civilization itself, endangered the very  
existence of “the West”. 
—————— 
 
Borkenau, Franz, Luther. Ost oder West?, in: Borkenau, Franz, Drei Abhandlungen zur deutschen 
Geschichte, Frankfurt am Main 1947, pp. 45-75. 
21  For a helpful digest of Toynbee’s “Western civ.” narrative see Toynbee, Arnold J., Civilization on 
Trial, New York 1948; see also De Beus, J.G., The Future of the West, London 1953; Herman, Ar-
thur, The Idea of Decline in Western History, New York 1997; McNeill, William H., Arnold J. 
Toynbee. A Life, New York 1989. 
22  Borkenau, After the Atom, pp. 443, 445. 
23  Löwenthal, Richard [Sering, Paul], Jenseits des Kapitalismus. Ein Beitrag zur sozialistischen Neu-
orientierung. Mit einer ausführlichen Einführung: Nach 30 Jahren, Bonn 1977 (first ed. 1947).  
24  Löwenthal, Totalitarian Revolutions of our Time, pp. 541-542. 
25  Koselleck, Reinhart, Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, Frankfurt am Main 
1979. 
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Recent studies have pointed out a whole array of far-reaching changes that  
“Western societies” experienced from the late 1950s onward. Andreas Wirsching, for 
instance, suggests that the transformation from a production-based to a consumer-
oriented society was one of the hallmarks of a decisive socio-cultural change that rap-
idly accelerated from the late 1960s, early 1970s onward. He argues that an era of 
“bourgeois modernity” came to an end – an interpretation that certainly dovetails with 
Löwenthal’s observations, if probably not with his diagnosis of crisis.26  
This leads me to the following conclusion: The language of “Western civilization”, 
closely intertwined since the nineteenth century with notions of progress, liberty, and 
rationality27, was an effective way of negotiating fundamental values and the future of 
industrially advanced pluralist societies. Löwenthal articulated his observation of rapid 
socio-cultural change by resorting to rhetorical patterns of “crisis”, “demise”, and the 
fear for “survival”, patterns deeply inscribed in the language of “Western civilization”. 
His main aim was to preserve security through stabilizing an identity “nested”28 in the 
narrative community of “Western civilization”. 
The usage of the “Western crisis” paradigm was indeed rooted in existential anxie-
ties. At the same time, though, it was also deployed as a means of dramatization to raise 
an awareness of the dangers hovering over “the West”. In fact, it may be argued that the 
“crisis” term was to evoke a sense of immediacy and urgency. This would be in line 
with what recent reflections on the cultural construction of crises suggest. Rather than 
encapsulating a particular moment in time, constructs of crises often encompass a proc-
ess – in our case, a wide-ranging process of socio-cultural change. The rhetoric of crisis 
created the notion of an acceleration of time that condensed the process of actual 
change. In other words, the dramatization of societal change perceived as alarmingly 
fast evoked the image of a transformation that was even more disturbing.  
In another respect, however, my study of Löwenthal’s reflections on a “crisis of 
Western civilization” does not confirm recent research on the rhetorical construct of 
crises. It has been suggested that constructs of crises were marked by an inner ambigu-
ity, as they offered an argument for pursuing an alternative, future-oriented political 
agenda that lends the notion of crisis a positive meaning.29 In fact, if one would turn to 
socialist intellectuals such as Michael Harrington or Irving Howe, one could indeed see 
—————— 
 
26  Wirsching, Andreas, Konsum statt Arbeit? Zum Wandel von Individualität in der modernen  
Massengesellschaft, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 57 (2009), pp. 171-199; see also Doe-
ring-Manteuffel, Anselm, Nach dem Boom. Brüche und Kontinuitäten der Industriemoderne seit 
1970, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 55 (2007), pp. 559-581. Similarly, Ulrich Herbert 
claims that an era of “high modernity” came to a close in the late 1960s, early 1970s. Herbert, Ul-
rich, Europe in High Modernity. Reflections on a Theory of the 20th Century, in: Journal of Modern 
European History 5 (2007), pp. 5-21; see also Bavaj, Riccardo, Auf der Suche nach einer  
europäischen Moderne, in: Kühberger, Christoph; Sedmak, Clemens (eds.), Europäische Geschichts-
kultur – Europäische Geschichtspolitik. Vom Erfinden, Entdecken, Erarbeiten der Bedeutung von 
Erinnerung für das Verständnis und Selbstverständnis Europas, Innsbruck 2009, pp. 235-247. 
27  See Bonnett, Alastair, The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History, Basingstoke 2004;  
GoGwilt, Christopher, The Invention of the West. Joseph Conrad and the Double-Mapping of 
Europe and Empire, Stanford 1995; Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus, Civilizing the Enemy. German Re-
construction and the Invention of the West, Ann Arbor 2006. 
28  For the concept of “nested identities” see Herb, Guntram H.; Kaplan, David H. (eds.), Nested Identi-
ties. Nationalism, Territory, and Scale, Lanham 1999.  
29  See for instance Föllmer, Moritz; Graf, Rüdiger (eds.), Die “Krise” der Weimarer Republik. Zur 
Kritik eines Deutungsmusters, Frankfurt am Main 2005. 
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the rhetoric of crisis exploited for legitimizing socialist policy schemes.30 Liberal intel-
lectuals, however, such as the “right-wing” Social Democrat Richard Löwenthal de-
ployed the “Western crisis” paradigm from a purely defensive angle. Far from widening 
the space of possibilities, they were trying to narrow it down. Their concern with the 
future of “Western civilization” was a concern about its survival. Whatever they  
suggested to change, it was for the purpose of preserving the status quo. 
When Löwenthal tried to make sense of the rapid transformation of “Western socie-
ties” by resorting to well-established categories rooted in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, his verdict was bound to lead to a diagnosis of crisis. After all, the 
“Western civ.” paradigm was not just intertwined with notions of progress and rational-
ity, but also with constructions of crisis. 
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